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RECENT DECISIONS 
AnMIRALTY-"TWILIGHT ZONE" IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PURSUIT 
OF STATE COMMON LAw ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYER-Petitioner was injured 
on his employer's barge moored in navigable waters while assisting in a 
loading operation. The employer was insured solely under the Federal 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.1 Instead of pursuing the remedy 
available under the federal act, petitioner brought the common law action 
authorized by state workmen's compensation legislation in the state courts.2 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the employer3 on the 
ground that the injury was covered exclusively by the federal act. On 
certiorari to 1:he United States Supreme Court, held, reversed per curiam, 
two justices dissenting. The injury was incurred within the "twilight zone" 
in which the election of forum by the claimant will be judicially respected. 
The applicability of the state law is not determined by the scope of the 
employer's insurance coverage. Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 
358 U.S. 272 (1959). 
In Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. Jensen4 it was held that the essential 
uniformity of the federal maritime power barred coverage of maritime in-
juries by state workmen's compensation legislation. After unsuccessfully 
trying to permit state coverage,5 Congress responded to judicial suggestion6 
and enacted the Longshoremen's Act to alleviate the plight of the maritime 
worker.7 By the terms of the act,8 its coverage and that which could con-
stitutionally be afforded by state legislation are mutually exclusive.9 But 
144 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §§901-950. 
2 The Oregon statute authorizes a common law action without the common law 
defenses where an injured employee's employer is not insured under the state act but was 
subject thereto. Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §656.024. 
s Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., (Ore. 1958) 320 P. (2d) 668. 
4 224 U.S. 205 (1917). The opposite result on the same facts was recently reached 
in Noah v. Liberty 'Mutual Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1959) 27 U.S. LAw WEEK (Gen. Sec.) 2467. 
5 Congress twice amended the Judiciary Act of 1789 to bring workmen's compensa• 
tion actions within the saving to suitors clause. Both amendments were held invalid. 
See 40 Stat. 395 (1917), declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 
U.S. 149 (1920); 42 Stat. 634 (1922), declared unconstitutional in State of Washington v. 
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). See, generally, GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAw OF 
ADMIRALTY §§6-48 (1957); 2 LARsON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §89.00 et seq. 
(1952); Rodes, "Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the 
Twilight Zone," 68 HAR.v. L. REv. 637 (1955); comment, 2 STAN. L. REv. 536 (1950); Eike!, 
"Legal Procedure in Maritime Personal Injury Litigation," 33 TULANE L,. REv. 323 (1959). 
6See State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., note 5 supra, at 227. 
7 Officers and members of the crew of a vessel remain covered solely by the Jones 
Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. Before passage of the Longshoremen's Act, shoreside 
workers who performed duties traditionally performed by seamen were covered by the 
Jones Act. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). However, these 
two statutes are now mutually exclusive. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). 
s 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §903(a). 
9 State compensation statutes applied where the locus of the injury was on shore. 
State Industrial Comm. v. Nordenhold Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). Where the locus of 
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in 1942, in Davis v. Department of Labor,10 the Supreme Court established 
a "twilight zone" within which federal or state coverage is presumed 
depending on the -employee's choice of forum.11 The probable purpose of 
the doctrine was to restore certainty of relief without extensive litiga-
tion, the aim of all workmen's compensation legislation. The primary 
question confronting courts subsequent to the Davis decision has been 
the determination of the extent of the twilight zone. Initially, the 
twilight zone was thought to cover only instances where the facts were not 
clearly within precedent.12 But in 1948 it became clear that the twilight 
zone extended to any case with both land and maritime aspects where 
doubt existed as to which statute applied, regardless of precedent.13 Since 
then courts have allowed recovery under state acts where prior to the Davis 
case precedent clearly required exclusive federal coverage,14 or have allowed 
recovery under the Longshoremen's Act where prior to Davis the case 
would have fallen into a clearly established "local" exception to federal 
coverage.16 
The principal case concedes that recovery under state law would not be 
the injury was on navigable waters, -but the activity in which the employee was engaged 
was local in character, state compensation statutes could likewise apply. Millers' In-
demnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (diver killed while sawing off timbers 
constituting a menace to navigation); Alaska Packers Assn. v. I.A.C., 276 U.S. 467 (1928) 
(worker pushing boat into water); Sultan R. &: Timber Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 277 U.S. 
135 (1928) (working on logging boom in navigable water). But if the activity in which 
the employee was engaged was national in impact and the injury occurred on navigable 
water, the state acts could not apply. Northern Coal &: Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 
(1928) (worker unloading vessel); John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) 
(dockyru;:d employee painting ship). 
10 317 U.S. 249 (1942). 
11 The presumption of a state statute's coverage and constitutionality overrides a 
determination by the highest court of the state that its act cannot be validly applied. 
See Baskin v. Industrial Accident Commission, 338 U.S. 854 (1949). Similarly, a federal 
officer's determination that the federal act does not apply will be revc;rsed. See Dixie Sand 
& Gravel Co. v. Holland, (6th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 304. 
12E.g., Hammond v. Albany Garage Co., 267 App. Div. 647, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 897 (1944); 
Behrle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 76 R.I. 106, 68 A. (2d) 63 (1949), cert den. 
339 U.S. 928 (1950). 
13 -Moores' Case, 323 Mass. 162 at 167, 80 N .E. (2d) 478 at 480 (1948), affd. per curiam 
sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moore, 335 U.S. 874 (1948). The decision assumes greater 
significance in the light of Baskin v. Industrial Accident Commission, note 11 supra, 
where a state court decision limiting the twilight zone's applicability to instances where 
precedents were not clear was summarily reversed. 
14 E.g., repairman injured on navigable ·waters: Emmons v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 
146 Tex. 496, 208 S.W. (2d) 884 (1948); Allisot v. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 
4 N.J. 445, 73 A. (2d) 153 (1950); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Marshall, (Tex. 1957) 308 
S.W. (2d) 174. Stevedores unloading vessel: Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, (La. 
1957) 95 S. (2d) 830; Noah v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., note 4 supra. 
15 E.g., Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953); Western Boat 
Building Co. v. O'Leary, (9th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 409; Dixie Sand &: Gravel Co. v. 
Holland, (6th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 304. See also Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 
U.S. 244 (1941); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY, c. 4, §14 (1939). 
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available if the injury were outside the twilight zone, implying that there 
still is an area in which the Longshoremen's Act is exclusive.16 But whethe,; 
this implication has much meaning after the holding in the principal case 
seems questionable. Never before has an employee been permitted to disre-
gard the clearly established coverage of the federal act17 in favor of a state 
common law remedy given him because his employer failed to participate 
in the state workmen's compensation program.18 By permitting him to do 
so, the Supreme Court now gives the maritime employer one of two equally 
unsatisfactory alternatives. He may continue to be covered under only one 
plan, thereby subjecting himself to possible unlimited common law liabil-
ity, as in the principal case,19 or he must participate in, and pay for, two 
sets of overlapping workmen's compensation coverage.20 Placing the mari-
time employer in this dilemma cannot be justified by reference to the legis-
lative policy underlying the Longshoremen's Act. The act was intended to 
provide maritime workers with the same type and certainty of relief as was 
available to workers covered by state compensation acts.21 This policy does 
not require that the employee be given a choice of two remedies, one of 
which may involve a jury trial, where a compensation remedy is clearly 
available. It might be more in accord with the legislative objective, 
and far less burdensome on the employer, to determine the availability of 
the remedy in twilight zone cases by reference to the employer's compensa-
tion coverage. On the other hand, the Court's growing dissatisfaction with 
the Jensen doctrine22 suggests that the present federal compensation scheme 
16 Principal case at 273. Also see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 
(1953); Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 220. But see Noah v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., note 4 supra. 
17 On this point see Chappell v. Johnson Lumber Co., (D.C. Ore. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 
625, revd. on other grounds (9th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 873; DeBardeleben Coal Co. v. 
Henderson, (5th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 481; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H., and H.R., 281 U.S. 
128 (1930); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McManigal, (4th Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 949. 
18 In Davis v. Department of Labor, note 10 supra, the Court at 255 emphasized that 
unless the state remedy was given, the employer would not have compensation coverage. 
19 It may be that in such a common law action the employer will not be entitled to 
the common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. See, e.g., 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §656.024. 
20 The overlapping nature of the remedies is seen in cases holding that the employee 
may obtain a supplementary award under the Longshoremen's Act after a successful 
state action for twilight zone injuries, or vice versa. See Western Boat Building Co. v. 
O'Leary, note 15 supra; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, (4th 
Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 968. But see Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 
76 (1951). The problem is fully discussed in comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1205 at 1215 (1958). 
21 See S. Rep. 973, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16; Davis v. Department of Labor, note 10 
supra, at 254. 
22 See Davis v. Department of Labor, note 10 supra, at 255. The uniformity doctrine 
has never been given much vitality outside the area of workmen's compensation. It does 
not bar state pilotage statutes [Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 
(53 U.S.) 298 (1851)], state wrongful death statute liens enforceable in admiralty [The 
Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907)], or liens for supplies furnished in a home port [The J.E. 
Rumbell, 148 U.S. I (1893)]. 
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has outlived its usefulness. Either exclusive federal coverage of all mari-
time injuries or recognition that the Jensen doctrine has outlived its use-
fulness and permitting state coverage of all such injuries would seem to 
be the logical solution to the present problem. · 
James S. Leigh 
